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―To breed an animal with the right to make promises – is this not the paradoxical problem nature has set itself with 
regard to man? And is it not mans true problem….. [As] a naturally forgetful animal‖ [Neitzsche 1956] 
March comments that: ―Administrative life seems to be filled with …seemingly pointless and endless 
commitments‖ [March 1984 p20]. He is both right and wrong. Commitments, or commissions as we term them, are 
indeed endless in administrative life, but are far from pointless - commissions being the seemingly simple pledges, 
sometimes large sometimes small, that, through many and varied mechanisms, are made, crafted, solicited, 
conduced and fulfilled by members of an organization; they are the objective-laden seeds of action. Commissions 
represent the links of the ‗means-ends‘ chain, the building blocks of the lateral organization of Burns [1954] and 
Blau [1955] that really makes organizations tick, and what fills the more recent ‗white space‘ of Rummler & 
Brache‘s [1988] organization charts, and even more crucially their business process flowcharts. These 
objective/action-laden entities are the vital mutable extra-somatic enabling complement of the immutable mobiles 
of Latour [1987]. 
In her conversation analytic study of managerial work Boden concludes: ― actors create and re-create their 
organizations ......Their talk …is the centre of their coordination‖[1994 p205]. ‗Coordination is the centre of their 
talk‘ may have been a somewhat better conclusion. It is our contention that at the centre of their talk, and at the 
centre of their myriad formal and informal somatic and extra-somatic interactions, are the fundamental processes 
that enable a state of collective endeavour to be achieved and maintained; those of the shaping and sustaining of 
commissions. We argue that commissions represent the central object of the work of organizing, and that the 
characteristics of commissions explain much of the findings of the stream of investigations into what has become 
known as ‗the nature of managerial work‘ [reviewed by Hales 1986, 1999 & 2001a/b]. The developed perspective 
peeling the ‗ontic onion‘ [Tsoukas 1994] to ‗expose‘ the processual coherence of the myriad, seemingly unrelated, 
and seemingly frenetic activities of phone calls, coffee machine conversations, memo writing, presentation making 
and formal meetings. We also contend that viewing organizations and organizing behaviour through this lens opens 
up new and highly practical empirical avenues in process organization studies, and the possibility of ―a new 
coupling between theory and data‖ [Langley 1999]. 
The developed conceptualisation emerged from an abductive reflection on two sequential field engagements 
[Lenney 2006, 2009]. The first field study comprised an 18-month auto-ethnography of the lead author during his 
engagement as an interim director. This auto-ethnography was complemented by a 24-month action research driven 
ethnographic engagement of the lead author alongside several senior managers within a large multi- national 
company. Any quotes deployed are drawn directly from the empirical material [in italics]. Given the lengthy and 
broad ranging managerial background of the lead author the field study should quite possibly be viewed as a 
reflective subjective-personal- introspection [Holbrook 2006] stimulated by field engagements; an attempt to 
respond to 
Bergson‘s entreaties for us to dive back into the flux, turn our faces to the sensation, and get to know it [all again!] 
from within‘ [1946]. Though a strong process view [Chia & Langley 2004] characterised the standpoint from which 
we viewed the empirical material, it was a strong process view coloured by the Whitehead‘s perspectives [1925, 
1929]. In contrast to Bergson, who advocated an uncompromising pursuit of better process thinking, Whitehead 
advocated an acceptance of an entitative perception of process as a central and crucial ingredient in our making 
sense of a processual world. Our ontology might be one of process [Rescher 1996], but we found our epistemology 
unavoidably and necessarily suffused with one particular entity as we sought to make sense the flowing 
organizational worlds experienced and observed – that of commissions. 
Theoretical Antecedents 
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The developed conceptualisation of commissions builds on Cooren‘s conception of ‗discursive objects‘ [1997, 
Taylor et al 1996], and exploits and develops the perspectives on collaborative work of Flores & Winograd [1980, 
1988] and the distributed artificial intelligence literature [Castelfranchi 1995 & 200, Singh 1999], to recover the 
explanatory potential of the sadly disregarded ‗provisional bonds‘ of Actor Network Theory [Strum & Latour 
1984]. 
From the very centre of the distributed artificial intelligence literature Aube and Sentini conclude: ―Within complex 
species that pursue multiple goals, and who absolutely require as such the cooperation of other agents, commissions 
[commitments] might well become (be seen as) the most important of all resources! Hence in a social species like 
ours, evolutionary forces would have favoured and selected out precisely those organisms that have become 
equipped with powerful mechanisms to insure control  over commissions [commitments]‖ [1996 p15]. It is 
significant that this quotation has direct resonance in the zoo-anthropological origins of the domain of social theory 
termed Actor- Network Theory [e.g. Latour 2005, Callon 1986, Law 1992]. Strum & Latour‘s study of baboons 
[1984, 1987] led Latour to the following conclusion: ―society is what is held together not what holds us together. 
Social scientists have mistaken the effect for the cause, the passive for the active, what is glued for the glue‖ [1986 
p276]. From Latour‘s perspective the ‗glue‘ that binds a collective is a heterogeneous array of what he termed 
‗extra-somatic‘ resources [1986 p264]. These extra-somatic resources represent ways of linking people that possess 
some degree of temporal persistence beyond the site of their inception/formation, including the material and 
inscriptive, and most centrally to our conceptions, ―the provisional bonds made by the actors‖ [Latour 1986 p264]. 
The Actor- Network studies that sprung from this origin have convincingly demonstrated the crucial role of 
material artefacts, whether textually inscribed or not, in stabilising, as Czarniawska [2008 p3] puts it, the 
―otherwise fragile relationships among humans‘. She continues ―Apes [and here she means non-human primates] 
are distinctly social animals, but relationships end when they part or, finally, with their death. Relationships 
between people leave traces on paper and on stone and can last for centuries‖. With the latter point one can hardly 
disagree; but the implication that relationships end when humans part, other than in that that is ‗materialised‘, is 
problematic in many dimensions, not least in the disregard of the ‗provisional bonds‘ category of Strum and 
Latour‘s extra-somatic resources that are so vital to human collective endeavour. It is a disregard that would appear 
to be endemic within A-N.T.; one potentially driven by an insistence to ascribe 
symmetry of agency between human and non-human actants - an insistence that we, and others, believe profoundly 
impoverishes the approach [Cooren & Fairhurst 2009; Hernes 2009]. Commissions are, from our perspective, a 
profoundly fundamental extra-somatic resource, and one through which most, if not all, purposefully deployed 
‗organizing actants‘ arise and operate. 
The pursuit of CSCW & DAI system software is founded on the speech act theory of Austin [1962] and Searle 
[1969, 1976, 1979] and their conception of ‗commisives‘ and ‗directives‘. ‗Commissives‘ are those speech-acts that 
‗commit‘ a speaker to some future course of action. ‗Directives‘ are their complement - those speech-acts that 
solicit ‗commissives‘. Winograd & Flores, and thence the ensuing field of systems research, label the ‗output‘ of 
this process a ‗commitment‘. In their terms commissive speech acts yield commitments. In our terms the 
commissioning process, speech mediated or not, yields, or at least has the potential to yield, commissions. 
Surprisingly, despite the conversation-analytic turn taken in the studies of managerial work undertaken by scholars 
such as Boden [1994], Ford & Ford [1995] and Samra-Fredricks [2000], these fine- grained analyses of 
conversational conduct would appear to have disregarded the ‗ontic level‘ of speech acts [Tsoukas 1994]. In the 
managerial work literature only Shotter [1993 p149], Sayles [1964 p27], Watson [2001 p223, 2002 p85], Carroll & 
Gillen [1987 p44] and Brunsson‘s studies of local government [1982 p32-33] make any mention of commissions, 
though they use the term commitments, and it is fleeting. 
It would appear that the only authors to have given commissions any attention within the mainstream management 
literature are Sull, Spinosa and Houldner (Sull, 2003; Sull and Spinosa, 2005; Sull, and Houldner, 2005; Sull and 
Spinosa, 2007). They use the term commitments and this practice will again be adopted in discussing their work. 
There are, however, crucial differences between commissions and the commitments of Sull et al. Sull and Spinosa 
have written a series of papers on cross-functional working and strategy implementation incorporating consulting 
and management training tools (Sull and Spinosa, 2005). Their purpose is almost entirely normative. Their aim is to 
persuade managers that there are ways in which what they also call promises can more readily be made and more 
thoroughly kept. However the road from the positive to the normative is not an easy one. To make this leap they 
have largely concentrated on major commitments. ―Actorial commitments take many forms, from capital 
investments to hiring decisions to public statements……,‖ (Sull, 2003). This definition of commitments seems to 
be relatively strategic in nature, that is to say a commitment has to have a major impact on the organization. They 
argue that ― …each commitment exerts both immediate and enduring influence on a company‖ (Sull et al., 2003). 
However we would argue that this is only the case for their conception of commitments.  
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Commissions are crucially also not necessarily, nor most usually, underpinned by any of the fundamental 
characteristics ascribed to commitments by Sull & Spinosa [2005, 2007] in their re-iteration of Salancik [1977] and 
Weick‘s [1995] conceptions: those of individual choice, explicitness, irreversibility and public awareness.  
Our theory of commissions is positive and meant to cover all levels of organizational commissions and 
commissioning – from the mundane to the magnificent. Sull et al‘s conception is prescriptive and because of that is 
confined to high level strategic commissions. The conceptions do not compete but rather complement each other – 
Sull et al‘s commitments can be seen  a most particular form of commission. 
It is in the field now labelled ‗The Communicative Constitution of Organization‘ [Putnam 
& Nicotera 2009] that one finds organization theory that speaks most substantively to the developed conception of 
commissions. Given the speech act origin of the perspective it may possibly not surprise that such penetration of 
the organization studies literature has taken place from the direction of communication theory [Cooren 1997 & 
2000]. Cooren exploits the semio-narrative speech act theory of Greimas [1987]; a theory that analyses speech acts 
from the perspective of the ‗objects‘ that they can be seen as putting into circulation among agents. These objects, 
such as an order, an apology, a request, advice, a question, encouragement, an assurance etc. – Cooren terms 
‗discursive objects‘. He sees these ‗texts‘, as he often re-labels them, circulating among agents acting like 
‗machines‘ to speak on behalf of an agent ― in the different narrative schemas that that constitute the temporal 
structure of any organizational form‖ [Cooren 2000 p 7]. The discursive objects of Greimas include four of modal 
action-precursory character- ‗a wanting to do‘, ‗a knowing how to do‘, ‗a being able to do‘, and ‗a having to do‘. In 
Cooren‘s analysis this latter category encompasses discursive objects such as pledges, promises, undertakings, 
commitments and, in our terms, commissions. In a cogent critique of actor-network theory Cooren [1997, 2000] 
contends that it is the inter-agent transfer of, and constant referral to such discursive objects, as well as the 
deployment of physical objects, that explains how agents coordinate their activities. He concludes that it is the 
‗restance‘ [Derrida ], the extra-somatic ‗staying power‘, of these discursive objects that enables organizations to 
endure. We agree with his critique and conclusion. CCO is a burgeoning field that has pursued, and is still persuing, 
an integrated communicative theory of organizing and organization [Taylor & Van Every 2000, Putnam & Nicotera 
2009], but the explanatory possibilities of the ‗entitative‘ character of Cooren‘s original discursive object 
perspective has been somewhat left behind, and what we see as its powerful high utility explanatory potential 
remains largely un-exploited some 14 years on; in the CCO literature and beyond. 
As has been noted commissions [commitments], as entities, have only received any substantial attention from 
researchers and system developers in the fields of computer supported co-operative work and most particularly in 
the development of multi- agent/distributed artificial intelligence systems. [e.g. Flores & Kremer 2002, Flores & 
Ludlow 1980, Winograd & Flores 1986, Flores et al 1988, Medina-Mora et al 1992, Denning & Medina-Mora 
1995, Kibble 2006, Jennings 1993, Castelfranchi 1998, Singh].  
However, the researchers in these fields have used a somewhat unsophisticated notion of commissions, their nature, 
and of the processes of their solicitation, acceptance and fulfilment (McCarthy, 1994 p80; Suchman, 1987, 1994). 
As Flores and his associates admitted, their ‗language action perspective‘ approaches would succeed only ―...in 
organizations in which users are relatively confident about their own position, and the power they have within 
it...(where) there is clarity about what is expected of people and what authority they have….where everyone is 
working for the good of all..[and]...parties recognize that honest dealings with each other will be the best for their 
shared benefit‖ (Flores et al, 1988, p.168). Clearly these conditions are rarely met in practice. The simplification 
and systematization of commissions and commissioning has not provided an easy hunting ground for groupware 
programmers or business process consultants. Nor is it proving an easy hunting ground for the massed armies of the 
D.A.I. research community (Castelfranchi 1995, 2000, 2001; Singh 1999) where, in their pursuit of the 
‗collaborating computer‘, they have, and are still, deeply reflecting on how humans go about collaborating (Read 
2004). ); and it is to this latter domain‘s treatment of commitments that we owe the most theoretical debt. 
We have chosen to deploy the somewhat different terminology of commissions rather than commitments for 
several reasons. Firstly the systems development  driven conception of commitments has really only had room for 
the simplest conception of commissions, their characteristics & properties, and, most particularly, an extremely thin 
and inappropriately techno-rational treatment of their solicitation, acceptance and fulfilment [McCarthy 1994 p80; 
Suchman 1987, 1994,]. The treatments that have become embedded in this stream of research do not do justice to 
commissions as ‗entities‘, or to the sophistication and subtlety of the ‗commissioning‘ process. Flores and his co-
workers themselves comment that ‗language action perspective‘ based approaches will succeed only: ―...in 
organizations in which users are relatively confident about their own position, and the power they have within 
it...[where] there is clarity about what is expected of people and what authority they have….where everyone is 
working for the good of all..[and]...parties recognize that honest dealings with each other will be the best for their 
shared benefit.‖ [Flores et al 1988 p168]. We contend these conditions are seldom met in practice! Secondly, as 
previously mentioned, commissions are not necessarily, nor most usulally, underpinned by any of the fundamental 
characteristics ascribed to the commitments of the work of Salancik [1977] and Weick [1995]; nor as re-iterated 
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and deployed by Sull & Spinosa [2003] in somewhat different form - those of individual choice, explicitness, 
irreversibility and public awareness. Commissions also bear no conceptual comparison to the commitments of 
Weick as they are not behaviours that become ―an undeniable and unchangeable aspect of the person‘s world‖ 
[1993 p11] and they are not actions, nor necessarily even the sort of pledge, which binds [Staw 1981]; in these 
latter senses commissions are definitively not of the same ilk as commitments. 
Commissions, these organizationally crucial ‗provisional bonds‘, have been left behind by A-NT, under exploited 
by CCO, and mistreated in the pursuit of Computer Supported Cooperative Work systems (CSCW) and Distributed 
Artificial Intelligence (DAI) systems [Winograd 1987-88; O‘Hare & Jennings 1996]. In the conceptualisation of 
commissions outlined below we attempt to begin the rehabilitation of the ‗commitments‘ of computer supported 
cooperative work & distributed artificial intelligence, the recovery of the ‗provisional bonds‘ of Latour and, 
building on the CCO foundations laid by Cooren [1997], begin the recovery of what we believe to be some 
important lost ground. 
The paper unpacks these objective–laden inter-subjective entities, these [products of] inter-actions, to reveal their 
constitution, properties and character. It is an unpacking that, as it ‗reveals‘ the character and properties of 
commissions, sheds illumination on the complex processes of their constitution – their shaping and sustaining. 
Commissions 
A commission is an undertaking through which someone agrees/accedes to endeavour to do, or refrain from doing, 
‗something‘; they are the deceptively simple ‗promises-to- endeavour‘, sometimes large  sometimes small,  that are 
solicited, captured, accepted, conduced and fulfilled in collective endeavour. Commissions are ephemeral entities 
that rest in the ‗space between‘ actors, and for the proximal-relational thinker, it is in this ‗space between actors‘ 
where the real action is [Cooper & Law 1995 p245, Bradbury & Bergmann 2000]. 
Commissions, Intentions & Expectations 
Intentions could be said to have the form of intra-subjective commissions: ‗I‘ll attend that meeting; I‘m going to 
support that investment in advertising; I am not going to tell the MD that just yet; I‘ll let her do it on her own this 
time; it‘s rubbish to my mind but I‘m going to keep quiet; it‘s not perfect but it‘s good enough; I‘m going to call 
[the FD] and tell him these numbers just don‘t make sense‘. This would, however, be a potentially misleading 
perspective. Commissions are fundamentally inter-subjective; intentions are fundamentally intra-subjective. 
Intentions and expectations are the potential intra- subjective consequence of commissions. Commissions may 
generate expectations, intentions cannot. Commissions may generate intentions; but may not. Expectations 
represent the vital assumptions with regard to ones collaborators intentions, and hence their contemporaneous and 
projected actions, that underpin collective endeavour. In Luhman‘s terms, expectations, in their provision of an 
anticipatory structure, generate the founding condition for connective action [1995], but unlike commissions, they 
rest, as Hernes puts it, firmly ―in the psychic not the social realm‖ [2008]. 
Intentions and expectations may be two sides of the same intra-subjective coin, but commissions are the inter-
subjective metal from which the coin is cast. 
Inter-subjectivity & Authenticity 
No purported macro-actor [Callon & Latour 1981, Callon & Law 1982, Czarniawska & Hernes 2005], be it an 
organization, department, function or government can accept or capture a commission. Commissions are 
fundamentally inter-subjective; they have a ‗who to whom‘ character. Actors may make what might be termed joint 
commissions, where those individuals involved in making a commission to a third party cannot unilaterally rescind 
it [Royakkers & Dignum 1999]. However, this ‗jointness‘ is itself simply a manifestation of other implicit, if not 
explicit, commissions between the commissioning parties. 
Authority can be seen as the capability of an individual to take up commissions on behalf of, or conduce 
commissions within, a certain set of individuals. An individual with a particular hierarchical position having within 
their ‗power‘ the capability of accepting on behalf of others, and potentially fulfilling through these others, arrays 
of commissions beyond only personal ones. However, there is only ever the potentiality of a macro-actor in the 
acceptance of such a commission, as commissions are only ever inter-subjective. In essence the actor of authority, 
the putative spokesperson of the incipient macro-actor, is taking up a commission of a certain kind, one to engage 
in the capture of commissions from others. As Latour comments: ―Power is the illusion people get when they are 
obeyed…[they] discover what their power is really made of when they start to lose it. They realise, but too late, that 
it was ‗made‘ of the wills of others‖ [1986 p 268] 
So, only individuals can have intentions & expectations, and only individuals can capture and accept commissions, 
even though they may do so on -behalf of a seemingly manifest macro-actor. However, as we all know from often 
bitter experience, an individual‘s intentions may not necessarily be congruent or consistent with their manifest 
commissions. ‗Authenticity‘ is hence a much sought characteristic of accepted commissions; though of course, 
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even if the commission is authentic, if it has been made on behalf of an incipient macro-actor, it remains 
intrinsically tenuous and fragile. 
 
Dimensions & Forms of Commissions 
What, Who, When and How represent the four central dimensions in which commissions are specified. All 
commissions must have at least the first two of these dimensions. The ‗what‘ refers to the ‗content‘ of a 
commission e.g. ‗we‘ll take the retailers logo off the ‗available-at‘ tag that‘s been put on the ‗Zest‘ Adshel poster‘ 
and the ‗how‘, its mode of fulfilment e.g. ‗I‘ll talk to the customer tonight and the agency first thing tomorrow‘. 
Nine forms of commission content / ‗what‘ predominate. Commissions to: 
1. Execute a physical act e.g. ‗You have to ensure you are at the exec meeting‘ 
2. Execute a cognitive act e.g. ‗OK, I‘ll think about that manufacturing option‘ 
3. Prioritise / sequence e.g. ‗Tony, we‘ll kill this key account problem off first eh?‖ 
4. Focus attention e.g. ‗you will need to watch the Chinese financials carefully ‘ 
5. Exhibit certain behaviour 
e.g. ‗not quite the way I see it, but I‘ll support you at the board‘ 
6. Allocate resources; for example: 
a. Financial e.g. ‗Zeb OK!!..I‘ll authorise the spend‘ 
b. Physical e.g. ‗Let them use that stock – we‘ll take the hit‘ 
c. Man-hours e.g.‗I‘ll put Sandi on it full time‘ 
7. Endeavour to achieve a projected outcome 
e.g. ‗We‘ll do whatever it takes to get the factory finished on time‖ 
8. Engage in the processes of commissioning, i.e. endeavour to shape and/or sustain commissions 
e.g. ‗don‘t worry, I‘ll get the German team to use the group system‘ 
In essence all commissions are of forms 6 & 7, as they are all potential resource deployments of some kind in the 
pursuit of a particular outcome. Commissions give actors access to what might be termed second-order resources in 
the pursuit of their goals [Aube & Sentini 1995]. In effect all commissions have the form of goal commissions, but 
with differing extents and degrees of specification in the ‗how‘ dimension. The objective always embedded within 
a commission represents, one might say, its ‗spirit‘. 
The ‗when‘ dimension in a sense demands no further elaboration; except to stress that it is a fundamental 
characteristic of commissions that their capture and acceptance are temporally, and most often spatially, dislocated 
from their potential fulfilment or dissolution. They hold the promise, to use Bratman‘s phrase, of ‗future directed 
intentions‘; they are not ‗present directed intentions‘ [Bratman 1984]. Their crafting and fulfilment are rarely 
synchronous and hence they must possess temporal persistence of some degree [cf. Law 1994]. At this point it must 
be stressed that all commissions are commissions to strive to take action of a certain form to achieve a particular 
goal. There is never certainty of fulfilment. Commissions might be said to sit on a multi-dimensional spectrum of 
fulfilment probability. The question: ‗to what degree, in what dimensions, is this commission likely to be fulfilled‘ 
is one that implicitly, if not explicitly, suffused the observed managerial deliberations; not least in those concerned 
with so-termed organizational change/development programmes. 
At first sight the ‗who‘ dimension appears simple. But the essential temporal dislocation of capture and fulfilment 
ensures it has a problematic nature. The frequency and rapidity of structural and personnel change in the studied 
organisations, and those personally experienced, made it highly problematic, with carefully crafted, and often 
critical commissions dissolving, no matter how carefully ‗materially inscribed‘, when individuals ―moved on, or 
out‖: ―When I [European Marketing Director] was in H.Q. the rumour was that [the Global Chief Marketing 
Officer] was going to resign... came back.... having convinced people in H.Q. that it was the right thing to do... 
everyone convinced about that ...then the C.M.O. resigned, and his number two! So people here started to get 
nervous… now in a position don't know if I've got the money or not... global had committed to some money.. 
nobody more senior than me will make any decision now ‗cause they're all so nervous‖. 
This piece of empirical material powerfully exemplifies the intrinsic inter-subjective, individual-to-individual 
character of commissions; no matter if the individual putatively acts on behalf of a macro-actor. Since Weber the 
theory of formal organizations has, in its abstractions, mostly deleted the individual, thus ensuring that the theory 
cannot easily speak to the brute facts of the concrete lived experience of our studied managers. Roles and functions 
cannot capture, accept or fulfil commissions – only individuals can. 
Commission Viability, Looseness, Mutation & Strength 
The acceptance of a commission may be fully authentic, but an agent‘s beliefs at the moment of acceptance may be 
based on inappropriate assumptions. Commissions may therefore be accepted on the basis of false premises, 
particularly with regard to their conflict with other commissions; possibly even within the commission portfolio of 
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the same actor. Most particularly commissions may be made on a provisional basis, particularly where the 
deployment of scarce resources is involved. Commissions are therefore more or less viable at the point of their 
inception. 
Most commissions are also underdetermined. As Ford & Ford put it: ―People regularly make requests and 
promises, set deadlines, show evidence of completion...but seldom set clear conditions of satisfaction, insist on 
accountability for fulfilling these conditions, or communicate straightforwardly to renegotiate the performance 
agreement‖ [1995 p550]. As a result commissions almost inevitably suffer from what might be termed ‗looseness‘; 
a characteristic exemplified in the following dialogue. 
Joe: You know we‘ve missed it!? 
Katie: But we knew about that..How the hell!? 
Joe: Yeah, we knew about it, but we didn‘t get to know when they were placing the actual order, which is what I 
was waiting for...‘cause there were loads of amendments and changes to make..didn‘t you know that? 
Katie: No I didn‘t but... 
Joe: Well it was almost a total re-design we had to do..but anyway I‘d spoken to the purchasing and commercial 
guys about it back then..told them I needed to know when the order was getting placed OK...so I could put up the 
amended customer orders against it before....then wham!.. saw Chris last Thursday..said hey thought you‘d let me 
know when the order had been put up..told me it had been done..and that it had been bought!! 
Katie: So we can‘t.....? 
Joe: No! But I didn‘t think what we were doing was right anyway! 
Katie: What!!??? 
Looseness is an intrinsic property of commissions, as it is rare that their constituent components(s) can be 
comprehensively or rigorously specified in all their dimensions, because, as Isenberg comments: ―..like the 
proverbial manual for riding a bicycle, an action plan can never be entirely spelled out, because there is always 
another level of operational specificity‖ [Isenberg 1986 p259]. As a result, determining the meaning of 
‗commission descriptions‘, in specific situations, is an important component of the commission fulfilling conduct 
of organizational actors. 
Very often commissions also ‗pass through many hands‘ on route to their fulfilment. These ‗tokens‘, as the ANT 
theorists may term them are, ―in many hands [and] everyone shapes it according to their different projects….[and] 
faithful transmission...becomes a single unusual case among many, more likely, others‖ [Latour 1986 p268]. 
Commissions therefore, given their inherent looseness, frequently mutate to some degree on route to their 
fulfilment. 
Additionally, even when fully authentic in their acceptance, commissions are accepted with differing degrees of 
commitment to their fulfilment : ―..I‘m just fed up of people agreeing, then doing exactly the opposite...I‘m gonna 
get some kind of electrocution system.....‖. There can be differing degrees of commitment to a commission, and in 
this sense commissions could be said to possess differing ‗strength‘. When the strength of a commission is low it is 
more vulnerable to mutation. 
Commission Durability 
As the following typical quotes well illustrate, commissions often lack durability; they are labile: 
― ..We actually put our bid in for [T]...and got it over [Competitor A]...now in a state where we‘ve got it, but I‘m 
sat here thinking should we have it...‘cause not sure people support it now‖ 
―Activity was due to start middle of July, that‘s what we‘d told [X],... but then there was feedback from the 
factory...there was problems..Wouldn‘t hit… ‗til end July...all the media had been booked so...‖ 
―..The budget we set out with, for the [D].., they‘re saying they now can‘t work to that budget‖ 
The accidental, or deliberately malicious, lack of fulfilment of commissions does, of course, contribute to the 
vulnerability of collective endeavour. However, most of the commission lability with which organizational actors 
contend derives from the ‗changes of mind‘, ‗changes in people‘, ‗changes of situation‘, ‗unexpected outcomes‘ 
and the unintended consequences of the turbulent milieu in which they are embedded. Clearly the greater the 
temporal dislocation of commission inception and fulfilment, or commission duration, the more vulnerable a 
commission will be. 
The Inter-connectedness of Commissions 
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Commissions rarely exist in isolation. Most often they are embedded in a network of interdependent commissions 
where they are linked in differing dimensions, and to different degrees, to other commissions, and through those 
first order connections to many more commissions in a commission network. Networks of commissions are 
pervaded by interdependency in all their dimensions.  
This interdependency is most clearly empirically manifest in the ubiquitous action/project plans of the 
organizational lives observed. These so-evidenced networks of commissions are very often extensive, and complex, 
with many of their constituent commissions very tightly coupled, not least in the temporal dimension: ―global went 
off their timeline again...everything kinda feeds off [X ]‗n what global are doing..y‘know..if you‘re not clear on that 
then that will knock back on everything else that you do...how do we get right and ready all the relevant materials 
to do a compelling account presentation for the sell-in that‘s due if we haven‘t got...  well everything....there‘s a 
real knock-on effect‖ 
Given the previously elaborated properties of commissions, commission networks are clearly a precarious and 
fragile achievement. Even when their constituent commissions are durable, strong and their scope & degree of 
specification is comprehensive and tight, the overall scope & degree of specification of ‗networks of commissions‘ 
is most often somewhat ‗loose‘. This is a result, one might say, of the commission network equivalent of 
‗engineering-tolerance stack-up‘: ―..there‘s been a load of confusion [Jim]..it‘s not turned out the way we 
envisaged..basically now it‘s too late to fix anyway, we‘ve got to use what‘s approved not what [F] wants 
now..they should be here on Friday, if we get them back you will be able to use them...but [Simon] isn‘t in ‗til 
Friday now so can‘t...don‘t know when [C] coming back on it now anyway so can‘t hang it together now, [Paul] 
may know…but the [Xs] are due in on the fifteenth!‖. The tightly coupled character commission networks, and the 
properties of their constituent commissions, ensure commission networks are highly precarious – they afford no 
ease or assurance in any dimension. 
It is our contention that it is in the direction of commission networks that social network researchers and others 
should turn their attention in pursuit of the ‗good network theory organization‘ for which Salancik [1995] published 
a ‗WANTED‘ poster. 
Commission & Commission Network Robustness 
Commissions, given their predominant forms, their prevalent ‗looseness‘, mutation, differing strength, and lack of 
durability are, as a result, inherently precarious. This inherent precariousness would, at first sight, appear to be a 
wholly negative attribute of commissions. This is an unsurprising perspective given the fundamental place of 
fulfilled commissions in the achievement of a collective objectives. However, the inherent unreliability that derives 
from these characteristics is clearly the flip-side of the prized attributes of flexibility and responsiveness. The 
‗price‘ of the flexibility and responsiveness that the turbulence of the commercial milieu may demand is the 
inherent unreliability of the crafted commissions. Unreliability is an intrinsic property of commissions; but it is the 
flip-side, and the necessary consequence of a most crucial property - ‗responsive modulatability‘. 
Latour contends [1987 p227] that large scale attempts at ordering depend for  their success on the deployment of 
immutable mobiles. In stark contrast we contend that, although such success may well require immutable mobiles 
of one form or another, such sustainable distanciation is far more crucially dependent upon the ‗mutable mobiles‘ 
that we term commissions [cf. Law 1994 p102], and most particularly those resilient- responsive commissions we 
characterize as robust. Given the turbulence, indeterminacy and complexity of the organizational and business 
milieu, it is in the ‗spirit‘ of their accepted commissions, not in their detail, that one needs ones collaborators to act. 
These mutable mobiles, these robust, most ‗reliable‘ of commissions, are those where the spirit of their embedded 
objective is at the centre of their capture/acceptance, and where their specification is detailed enough to enable 
coordination but soft enough to enable their responsive, often improvisational, modulation in the face of inevitable 
exigencies and unintended consequences. The most resilient and least precarious commission networks are those 
crafted from such robust commissions, and it is to this craft that we now turn. 
Commissioning 
The developed model of commissioning is based on the metaphor of a temporal rope, with the strands and threads 
of the rope representing processes in which the subject actors were engaged [c.f. Marples 1967, p287]; with the 
length of the rope representing time [Figure 1]. Each of the processes becoming ‗visible‘ when the subject 
managers engage in them, just as the strands and threads of a rope become visible as they surface repeatedly over 
its length. The cross-section of this metaphorical rope is presented graphically in Figure 2. Although there is no 
simple temporal sequential relationship between the ‗shaping‘ and ‗sustaining‘ strands, commissions have 
obviously to be shaped before they can be sustained. However it is clear that the shaping of commissions can be 
interpreted as simply the extreme form of commission modulation. There is no ‗beginning‘; the ‗shaping‘ strand 
merely has a ‗goal seeking‘ character, whereas the ‗sustaining‘ strand a ‗goal directed‘ one [Sharifi  1988] - see 
Figure 3. 
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In the space available, and given the necessary focus on the commission entity itself, it is not possible to discuss 
fully all of the components of the developed model of commissioning – our focus is therefore on what are seen as 
the aspects of the model most sensitive to the properties of the commission entity itself, and where there are the 
most significant theoretical caveats. 
Sustaining Commissions 
―The value of brute persistence may be vastly more important than the scarcity of references to it in the 
management literature would suggest‖ [Peters 1978 p 12]. 
Commissions are constantly being, both formally and informally, monitored and their meanings maintained and 
continually elaborated in all their dimensions: 
― ...lots, ‗n lots, ‗n lots of calls...a whole day of calls..talking to people, getting things done, making sure things 
were happening, chasing and chasing things 
 ―,. ..constant interaction to keep things on track...constantly I am saying ‗ what has happened with this and what 
has happened with that, and where are we up to, ‗n what needs to happen now...‖ 
The studied organizational actors spent the vast majority of their time in the sustaining of commissions. As Sayles 
puts it: ―..the actions of each manager affect all the other groups around him, and they must make adjustments 
before he can shift his own efforts. As one or more groups make what are, for him, less than optimal moves, our 
manager must make compensating moves. These, in their turn, affect still other groups and so our peripatetic 
manager must go around the circuit again securing new agreements, commissions [commitments], and assurances 
from those he had committed to something else only shortly before ….‖ [Sayles 1964 p26-27]. They expended 
huge energy in their ―keeping things on track‖, as they put it, despite a plethora of disturbing contingencies, un- 
intended consequences and a veritable hail of exigencies. Commissions, given their elaborated properties have little 
momentum; they require a constant input of energy. The intrinsic fragility of commissions and the precariousness 
of the commission networks crafted therefrom necessitates this perpetual pursuit, with there being, of course, no 
panopticon [Foucault 1977, Bentham 1995(1785)] from which to conduce commissions. Networks of commissions 
represent the fragile substance of Strauss et al‘s ‗negotiated order‘. When this negotiated order is effective, it is 
effective, not because the ‗negotiated‘ commissions are reliable [c.f Sull 2003, Sull & Spinosa 2005], but because 
they are constantly sustained. 
Procedures/routines are utilised to enhance the durability of the commission networks that undergird any repetitive 
collective action. However, as Mangham points out, even the sustaining of procedures is ―.. not [an] automatic 
occurrence but rather must be worked out and sustained by the repeated acts of participants‖ [1979 p74]. This 
maintenance, even of the supposedly institutionalised networks of commissions that constitute so-called ‗business 
processes‘, is a perpetual activity; which at times does not necessarily receive what might be seen as the requisite 
level of attention:―..sometimes there are  very  dangerous  assumptions  about  what  is  or  is  not  being  
progressed‖  . 
Commissions are both the progenitors and descendants of procedures [Singh 1999]. Procedures/routines are 
methodological prototypes. They represent latent networks of commissions, the fulfilment of which has been found 
from experience to have had a requisite effect/achieve a particular objective; most usually captured in some form of 
inscribed actant. The initiation of an established procedure, most usually a commission fulfilment itself, triggering 
a cascade of commissions that may, or may not, be picked up. The ostensive not always being faithfully represented 
in the performative [Feldman 2000, Feldman & Pentland 2003]. The latent constituent commissions of a 
procedure/routine are most often specified in all their dimensions other than one – ‗the who‘. Procedures represent 
scripts, where commissionees are defined in terms of roles/positions, but where specific actors are not identified 
[Barley 1986 p83]; in this way procedures carry what Weick terms generic subjectivity [1995 p72]. This 
anonymity, this deletion of identity from their constituent commissions, is fundamental to the stable ostensive 
ambition of routines [Feldman 2000, Feldman & Pentland 2003]. But, as previously highlighted, roles and 
functions cannot accept or fulfil commissions, only actors can. The re-insertion of identity into the constituent 
commissions of routines on their triggering drives their performative character, as the emanating commissions are 
picked up, interpreted and their fulfilment considered by the individuals actually involved. Substantially repetitive 
work was however very sparse in the contexts of our subject managers and the procedures when developed were 
more like dance routines than military marches, well rehearsed, but with substantial scope for improvisation 
[Feldman 2000]. The commissions that emanate from triggered procedures/routines, just as all other commissions, 
depend for the achievement of their embedded objective, on their appropriate interpretation at the time of 
acceptance/fulfilment. Hence one needs ones collaborators to act ‗in the spirit‘ of the emanating network of 
commissions. The most resilient of procedures/routines will therefore be those crafted from robust commissions 
‗inscribed‘ in technologies of the requisite plasticity to allow the responsive modulation of the routine/procedure in 
the face of inevitable exigency. 
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It is strikingly clear that very often the achieved result of commission fulfilment differs substantially from that that 
was envisaged on its capture. As Boden rightly concludes:― What ‗looks good‘ or practical or desirable at T1 often 
looks different a few days or weeks later, in the light of intervening information and events.‖ [Boden 1994 p191]; 
and as Clegg et al comment: ―Most managerial policies spawn a set of unintended consequences…‖ [2002 p491]. 
The continual monitoring and maintenance of commissions is therefore accompanied by their modulation in the 
face of exigencies, discrepancies and unintended consequences: 
―...we originally said we were gonna put their [retailer‘s] logo on the advertising..but we became less keen because 
as it ended up it was part of a bigger brand campaign and we had to back-track a little bit...we counterbalanced it 
with a real positive..we‘ve sited the ‗six-sheets‘ [posters] outside their sites..‖ 
―..what I‘ll try to do then is on the basis of this, I‘ll try to bail us out of the second lot of product..if I can..this is 
another one where we‘d probably have ordered just 200 but when everyone gets in a room and gets excited it goes 
to 1500..and everyone was right up for it at the time..then now all of a sudden!...‖ 
Modulations which can at times, given the lability of even the most substantial commissions, comprise the re-
crafting of an entire network of commissions: ―[Thursday].. managed to get the MD to say yes, to sign off two and 
half million pounds, got the FD to say yes, got the Euro-Marketing Director to say yes. so we all said yes. went to 
London.. said to the agency book the TV ‗n let's be really clear on the outdoor, went off and started to book things.. 
by the Monday we then had to find a £1 million saving...‖ 
As Hernes (2009 p27) observes Whitehead [(1929) 1978] suggests that we are far better off treating as living things 
the entities that we craft, and with which we thence contend. Our subject managers would seem to concur. The 
entities that they craft, commissions, as the vital objective-laden seeds of action that they represent, require a 
constant input of energy and careful nurturing if they are to survive and thence germinate into appropriate and 
timely action. 
Cultivating & Maintaining Relationships 
This second strand of conduct incorporates the cultivating of the personal relationships that underpin the effective 
shaping and sustaining of commissions [Kaplan 1984]; a thread of conduct that Kotter [1982] termed ‗networking‘. 
Compliance with norms, authority, procedures and the seeking of continuance may be heavily represented in 
individual rationales for the acceptance and fulfilling of commissions, but the influence of affective factors is at 
times very strong: ― I‘m only doing this for you y‘know; if it was anybody else I‘d...‖. This strand of conduct 
represents the proactive accrual of social capital [Adler & Kwon 2002] through many and varied mechanisms. 
Possibly most effectively, through the fulfillment of commissions to others; particularly those commissions where 
the degree of discretion is high and compulsion low. One could say that commissions represent the currency of 
coordination, and of social capital, and that, authentic, robust and fulfilled commissions represent the interest 
payments on the social capital accrued. 
Shaping Commissions 
―Much of the literature on decision-making....depends on cognitive models of individuals, whereas what seem to be 
needed are interactional models of people ‗thinking out loud together‘.‖ [Boden 1994 p 84-5] 
Organizational actors certainly do a lot of thinking out loud together when shaping commissions. The developed 
model provides a response to Boden and elaborates upon a form of conduct not dissimilar from what Strauss 
termed ‗articulation work‘ [1985, 1988], and what may be seen through the lens of A-N.T. as interest aligning 
enrolment processes [Callon & Law 1982, Latour 1986]. 
It is at this point that the apparent absence from the model of ‗decision-making‘ as a process in which managers are 
engaged should be explained. In the terms of the model decision is a way-mark not a process. Decision-making 
labels the transition from the shaping to the sustaining of commissions; the point when commissions are 
captured/accepted. In Whitehead‘s terms decision is a fundamental event – a point in time-space when entities 
emerge [Hernes 2009 p55]; the entities that emerge in the decision event being commissions. If decision is seen as 
the event when commissions emerge the commissions model can be seen as fundamentally compatible with 
Luhmann‘s perspective that ‗an organization that ceases to make decisions ceases to be an organization‘; no 
decision, no commissions, hence no commission network, and therefore no organization. If there is no acceptance 
of commissions – ‗no picking up‘ - the way-mark we term decision is not passed and the entire shaping endeavour 
is mere utterance [Whitehead (1929), 1978, Hernes 2009 p80]. Or as one of our subjects put it: ―N.A.T.O. – no 
action, talk only‖. However, as this manager was well aware, and as has been discussed, commission acceptance, 
and the passing of the way-mark termed decision does not necessarily mean that the emerging commissions will be 
fulfilled; their acceptance may not have been authentic, and even if authentic, the commissions may well not be 
robust. A decision event simply represents the beginning of the often arduous and always relentless process of their 
sustaining. 
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The shaping strand of conduct comprises strands and several threads of conduct. The Reporting/Informing and 
Sensing/Information Seeking threads require little further explanation.  
However it should be noted that the single most intense activity exhibited by the subject actors, within these 
complementary threads of conduct, was the monitoring of, and reporting on, states of commission/commission 
network fulfillment in all their dimensions. Given the often extensive-complex character and precariousness of 
commission networks this is unsurprising. 
The ‗mindfulness generating‘ thread of conduct requires some minor elaboration. The following extract exemplifies 
this particular thread of conduct. 
―This is not to worry any one... but I want you guys to know where the business is... you can see from this that it is 
not in a fully healthy shape ...our operating profit is now....... we are worse than we were last year at this 
point...product development costs are up selling costs are up and marketing costs are up...we‘ve got a higher fixed 
cost base now and sales are not growing as predicted .....you need to think very carefully about how and where we 
spend money and we've got to get the sales line going again..... we don't want to get into a negative spiral of sales 
going down pushing down promotional expense in response and sales then going down again.... we have to have a 
way of controlling cost to focus cash on supporting sales‖ 
The subject involved is, of course, sharing information in this endeavour, but that is not his central purpose. He is 
attempting to make his team ‗mindful‘ of certain aspects of the commercial situation, in order that they modulate 
their own shaping and sustaining of commissions in response. His purpose is to exert a form of premise control as 
Perrow terms it [1986 p130], and influence the frames of reference [Goleman 1985, Goffman 1974] that his 
subordinates employ in their shaping and sustaining of commissions. A process that was often facilitated by the 
crafting and promulgation of explicit, if not always detailed, rules, policies, credos and vision/mission statements 
etc. Just as their brethren - procedures, these represent purposeful distal constructs deployed to influence the 
proximal. 
The four constituent threads of the envisioning strand of conduct – ideating, option crafting, projecting, and the 
accepting & capture of commissions, are simple labels for forms of conduct that are easily discerned. Little further 
elaboration is intended, in the current paper. However, the remaining thread of conduct in the commission crafting 
strand, that labelled sensemaking, requires some attention. As elaborated below most aspects of the Weick et al‘s 
conception of sensemaking. [Weick 1969, 1979, 1995; Weick, Sutcliffe & Obsfeld 2005, Gioia 1986, Gioia & 
Chittipeddi 1991, Gioia & Thomas 1996] make it the ideal label for this crucial thread of commissioning conduct. 
However we hold a serious discomfort with the seeming distortion of one of the concept‘s core attributes. The 
meaning of the term sensemaking has been stretched in many directions by many scholars, but possibly most 
problematically into the future. With prospective sensemaking [Donnellon et al 1986 p49; Gioia et al 1994 p378] 
and future perfect thinking [Gioia et al 2002] in particular, attempts have been made to broaden the sensemaking 
concept to encapsulate the pervasive ‗what nextness‘ [Boden 1994 p193] of the managerial deliberations that we 
encountered in the empirical material. Based on the extant literature a case could be argued for labelling the entire 
envisioning strand of conduct ‗sensemaking‘. However these theoretical elaborations, though possibly linguistically 
and philosophically sound, struggle to adequately capture the speculative ideational character of the option crafting 
and projecting threads of conduct. Like Emirbayer and Mische we argue that attention must shift away from the 
‗retrospectivity‘ of sensemaking to better illuminate how organizational actors ―give shape and direction to future 
possibilities‖ [1998 p984] and highlight the central imaginative-projective dimension of organizational agency. As 
Bruner comments: ―[The second universal of human reflexivity] is our dazzling capacity to envision alternatives, to 
conceive of other ways of being, of acting, of striving. So while it may be the case that in some sense we are 
‗creatures of history‘, in another sense we are autonomous agents as well‖ [1990 p109]. The sensemaking process, 
as initially conceptualised by Weick, was explicitly and intrinsically retrospective [1969, 1979 1995] and as Gioia 
et al themselves emphasise, sensemaking is ‗past-focused‘ [2002 p 622]; we leave it so. The enactive aspect of the 
sensemaking concept [Weick 1979 p147; 1969 p63] is one of the two characteristics that render sensemaking the 
appropriate label for this thread of the commissioning process - ―Actors create and constitute the environment to 
which they react; the environment is put there by the actors in the organization and no-one else.‖ [Weick 1969 
p28]. Weick‘s conception of sensemaking [1995] explicitly accepts that what actors sense, investigate, interrogate 
and interpret, i.e. what they make sense of, is determined by what they pay attention to, their ‗appreciative system‘ 
[Vickers 1965, Pye 1995 p454], and that the determination of foci-of-attention is not a simple techno-rational 
process. Sensemaking, as Lyles & Mitroff [1980 p113] point out, is, at its very base a resource constrained socio-
political process. ―...management realities are not created internally in the manager‘s mind, nor externally by the 
organization and its structure, but constructed dialogically between managers and others in everyday 
conversations‖ [Cunliffe 2001 p354]. It is this intrinsically social nature of sensemaking that forms the second key 
part of its attraction as a thread label. The subject actors deliberatively crafted the degree of concordance as to 
‗what is‘, and ‗why what is, is‘, that they perceived as necessary for the crafting of commissions.  
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There was a lot of ‗talking things through‘. This ‗thinking out loud together‘ [Boden 1994] suffused the everyday 
commissioning conversations of the subject actors; it comprised an intense, at times fraught, collision of ideas, 
insights, perspectives,  judgements,  information,  presumptions,  expectations  and  explanations. 
Through these deliberations they melded the multi-subjective into the inter-subjective [c.f. Wiley 1988]; socially 
constructing the ‗alternity‘ [Thayer 1988 p254] on which they would found their crafting and capture of 
commissions/commission networks. The central outputs of the commission crafting strand of conduct are of course 
the ‗who, what, how and when‘ of individual commissions and commission networks; most often materially 
evidenced in the ubiquitous action arising notes, project plans, programs, budgets and strategy documents. 
However, the essence of its output was seen to be concordance as to the ‗why‘ – a crucial component of which was 
the ‗alternity‘, the ‗sensemake‘, on which the putative action was to be based. 
As has been noted given the intrinsic precariousness of commission networks, the prevalent ‗invisibility‘ of 
commission fulfilment (due to its usual spatial and intrinsic temporal dislocation), the very often weak and 
unreliable feedback loops that pertain, the acceptance of potentially conflicting commissions, and the aforesaid 
shaky epistemic foundations of the emergent ‗strategies‘, the subject actors required their collaborators to act in the 
‗spirit‘ of their commissions. In their pursuit of a less arduous sustaining challenge and more resilient and 
responsive commission networks, our subjects continually sought what we have described as robust commissions. 
Given their tightly coupled character all commission networks are intrinsically precarious and require relentless 
attention, but those networks built of robust commissions are more resilient and responsive. The deliberative-
concordancing character of the commission crafting process was fundamental to the pursuit and capture of such 
commissions. 
The resilient-responsive character of commission networks constructed from robust commissions could be argued 
to represent the fundamental micro-foundations of the adaptive loose coupling of organizations (Weick 1976, 
March & Olson 1975, March 1981), and the intrinsically deliberative-concordancing character of their 
commissioning the key to the ‗interlocking of behaviours‘ (Weick 1979) that underpins such responsiveness. 
A Concluding Reflection 
Commissions represent a major and essential component of Latour‘s heterogeneous organizational glue, but they 
have been largely ignored within A-N.T. and organization studies. Thankfully they have been kept alive, though 
somewhat mistreated during their captivity, within the D.A.I. literature. We contend that the developed entitative 
conception of commissions is an abstraction that usefully recovers the provisional bonds of Actor-Network Theory, 
and rehabilitates the systems driven conception of commitments. We believe commissions provide a powerful 
entitative lens through which to view organizing and organizations, and that commissions represent a highly 
researchable object of analysis in empirical studies of organizational process. 
The commissions approach outlined represents a fundamentally relational perspective that sees organizations as 
complex ―networks of active connections‖ [Cooper 2005]. It is one that collapses the differentiation-integration, 
mechanistic-organic, formal-informal organization and macro-micro dichotomies through the deployment of a 
conceptual entity that reveals both structure and process to be ―cut from the same cloth‖ [Bakken & Hernes 2006 
p1608]; or possibly more metaphorically accurately - as being woven, in the main, from the same fibres. The 
conceptual entity of commissions shines a penetrating light on the recursive shaping of one by the other, and as a 
result reveals a potentially crucial underlying mechanism of organizational autopoiesis [Bakken & Hernes 2003]. 
By throwing an entity laden light on the recursive-structurational relationship of process and structure [Giddens 
1984] we believe the developed perspective contributes to bridging the conceptual gap between, what some would 
term, the behavioural reductionism of Weick - that fails to account for the residual ‗structural‘ effects of action, and 
a Parsons inspired structuralism - that does not account for how, and from what, structure emerges [Bakken & 
Hernes 2003 Chapter 4]. It is also a conceptualisation that, through the objective-laden character of the commission 
entity, brings purposeful projective agency back to the centre stage of analysis (Emirbayer & Mische 1998). As a 
result we believe the commission/commissioning concept outlined succeeds in responding to the ambitions of the 
rapidly emerging field of process organization studies to develop theory that is proximal and fine grained enough to 
illuminate the concrete experience of action, whilst still retaining the conceptual capacity for dealing with the distal 
itself [Cooper & Law 1995] - what might be termed the more stable contexts for action – roles, functions etc. 
[Hernes 2008]. 
Latour rightly contends that provisional bonds are fast-decaying and that much effort is expended in the attempted 
shifting of these so-termed social ties to other supposedly more durable artefactualised/quasi-artefactualised links 
[2005 p66]. However, we contend that this is a strong argument for focussing even more on the elucidation of their 
character, and on the processes of their shaping and sustaining. Particularly as one can argue that artefacts, though 
part of actor-networks, only come to be a part through the faciliative-distanciation roles they play in the 
commissioning processes of human organizational actors [Hernes 2008 p65]; roles they only continue to play if 
they themselves are constantly sustained [Law 1994 p102].  
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Commissions are indeed labile, and, whether robust or not, require a relentless attention to their sustaining in order 
to ensure their survival, and appropriate fulfilment.  
They are meta-stable and so, though they hold much potential energy, with their intrinsic objective-laden character, 
they require a constant input of kinetic energy to achieve and maintain the necessary organizational persistence and 
viability. Their shaping and sustaining constitutes the essence of managerial work, and their sustaining represents 
its most demanding component. 
The commissioning model addresses the lacuna in the managerial work literature highlighted by Colin Hales, in 
answering his question - ‗why do managers do what they do‘ [1999], i.e. conduct themselves in the way they do. 
The developed model responds to Hales‘ question at the ‗ontic‘ level at which it is asked; at the ‗actual level‘, as 
the critical realists may term it, attempting to reveal the ‗deeper processes‘/‗mechanisms‘ of managerial work 
[Sayer 1992]. In Hales‘ terms the shaping and sustaining of commissions represent the behaviours that link 
manifest conduct to performance outcomes. The rope of conduct model elaborated may represent at least the 
beginnings of the much-sought explanatory account of the nature of managerial work. It is an account that 
appropriately conveys the processual dynamics of managerial work and one that eschews the highly static 
explanatory concepts of the managerial work literature. All of the preceding being concepts that are clearly 
explainable through, and simply encompassed by, the developed model. 
The entity founded experience-near [Geertz 1979 p226] abstraction of  commissions easily feeds back into concrete 
experience [Bakken & Hernes 2006 p1609], and hence enables an easy bridge to be made between the theorising of 
organizational behaviour, social psychology, the managerial work literature and the ‗competencies of conduct‘ that 
are the focus of the managerial skills arena. Though university management/business schools may not be the place 
for extensive socio-political skill development, the commissions/commissioning model provides an easily 
communicable conceptual framework that can be used to draw together and cohere, in an enlightening and 
demonstrably practical way, the insights of the organizational behaviour & politics, organizational sociology and 
social psychology disciplines, with the insights of the managerial work literature. As one of our colleagues 
commented, ‗teaching students about management in a lecture theatre is like trying to teach swimming in a damp 
room‘. We believe that the thoughtful pedagogical deployment of the developed model could, however, make the 
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